| At least two distinct factors, with at least one dynamically created or proven and unique to the transaction | Authentication Directions 2025, paragraphs 5(I)(f), 6(a) and 6(b) ↗ | A FortAuth passkey combines something the user has, a private key held in the secure hardware of the registered phone, with something the user is or knows, the device-native biometric or PIN that unlocks it. Both factor types appear in RBI's definition. Each approval signs a fresh challenge issued by the bank for that transaction, so the proof of possession is unique to it, which is what paragraph 6(b) asks for. | FortAuth |
| Robust factors, where compromising one does not affect the other, and alternatives to SMS OTP when code and app share a phone | Authentication Directions 2025, paragraph 6(c); Digital Payment Security Controls MD, paragraph 61 ↗ | With SMS OTP, malware or a SIM swap on the phone that also runs the app can take both the code and the session. A passkey's key cannot be exported from secure hardware, so a stolen PIN or a stolen phone is not enough on its own. The authenticator checks the biometric locally and nothing is sent over SMS. Both factors still live on one device, so the bank's robustness assessment under paragraph 9(a) should record why they stay independent. | FortAuth |
| Risk-based checks beyond the two-factor minimum, using device attributes, location and behaviour | Authentication Directions 2025, paragraph 8 ↗ | FortAuth lets the bank's risk engine call for a fresh passkey step-up on any transaction it flags. Optional device fingerprinting and VPN detection add the device attributes paragraph 8 lists. For the highest-risk cases, FortAgent can call the customer on the bank's own telephony, say it is an AI agent, and ask them to confirm with FortAuth on their registered phone. The risk policy and its thresholds remain the bank's. | FortAuthFortAgent |
| Issuer liable in full for losses on non-compliant transactions; bank bears the burden of proving customer liability | Authentication Directions 2025, paragraph 9(b); Responsible Business Conduct Third Amendment Directions 2026, paragraphs 76B(1) and 76K ↗ | Each FortAuth approval leaves a signed record showing which registered device and credential approved which transaction, and when. With Secure Payment Confirmation, the amount and payee shown to the customer are part of the signed data. When a complaint arrives, the bank holds evidence that the authentication met the directions and what the customer saw, rather than only a log showing that an SMS was sent. | FortAuth |
| MFA for adding, changing or deleting beneficiaries, changing account details and revising transfer limits | Digital Payment Security Controls MD, paragraph 34 ↗ | Each of these changes can require a passkey step-up in the app or on the web. Where the request comes through the contact centre, FortAgent sends a FortAuth confirmation to the customer's registered device rather than accepting details read out on the call. The alerts paragraph 34 also asks for remain the bank's SMS and email channels. | FortAuthFortAgent |
| Measures against man-in-the-middle, man-in-the-browser and phishing, so that only genuine sources can authenticate a transaction | Digital Payment Security Controls MD, paragraphs 30 and 34 ↗ | A FIDO2 passkey is bound to the bank's real domain or app. A look-alike site cannot ask the device to sign, and there is no code a customer can be talked into reading out. Signatures are checked on the bank's server, which is the centralised, server-side check paragraph 30 describes. | FortAuth |
| Device binding of the mobile app, notice of every new device, a record of registered devices and a way for the customer to disable one | Digital Payment Security Controls MD, paragraph 60 and footnote 5 ↗ | Each registered device holds its own passkey, which is device binding in hardware. The bank's credential list is its record of registered devices: it can notify the customer on every new registration, cap the number of devices, and let the customer disable any one from the app. Optional device fingerprinting adds the software and service signals the footnote prefers. | FortAuth |
| Audit trails detailed enough for forensic evidence and dispute resolution, including non-repudiation | IT Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices MD, paragraph 15(a) to 15(c) ↗ | FortAuth signatures can be checked by anyone holding the public key, so the bank can prove an approval without relying on its own logs. FortAgent transcribes, QA-scores and audit-trails every call. FortVoice records each transcribed command alongside the customer's on-screen confirmation before it executes. All of these records can feed the bank's existing log monitoring. | FortAuthFortAgentFortVoice |
| Telling customers they are dealing with AI, a way to reach a human, verifiable voice channels, and AI governed across its lifecycle | FREE-AI Committee Report, paragraph 4.4.54 and Recommendation 16 (recommendations, not directions) ↗ | FortAgent tells every caller they are speaking to an AI agent, and a person can take over at any point. It runs on the bank's own telephony, so calls can go out on the bank's verified 1601-series numbers. Every call is transcribed and QA-scored, and the bank can choose and change the model it governs. FortVoice shows each command on screen for confirmation, so no voice instruction acts unseen. | FortAgentFortVoice |
| Bank access to all data and logs held by an IT service provider, data stored in India where required, and security safeguards over processors | Outsourcing of IT Services MD, paragraphs 4(a), 16(b), 16(g) and 17(c); DPDP Rules 2025, rule 6(1) ↗ | All three products deploy on-premise in the bank's Indian data centre, in an Indian cloud region, or hybrid. Authentication records, speech and call recordings therefore stay in India and in the bank's control, which leaves less material outsourcing to govern. FortAuth stores only public keys, which reveal nothing if breached. Logs are the bank's to keep for the one year rule 6(1)(e) requires. | FortAuthFortVoiceFortAgent |